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Abstract
is paper investigates how inquiry into normative language can improve
substantive normative theorizing. First I examine twodimensions alongwhich
normative language diﬀers: “strength” and “subjectivity.” Next I show how
greater sensitivity to these features of the meaning and use of normative lan-
guage can illuminate debates about three issues in ethics: the coherence of
moral dilemmas, the possibility of supererogatory acts, and the connection
between making a normative judgment and being motivated to act accord-
ingly. e paper concludes with several brief reĘections on the theoretical
utility of the distinction—at least so-called—between “normative” and “non-
normative” language and judgment. ediscussions of these speciĕc linguistic
and normative issues can be seen as case studies illustrating the fruitfulness of
utilizing resources from philosophy of language for normative theory. Get-
ting clearer on the language we use in normative conversation and theorizing
can help us diagnose problems with bad arguments and formulate better mo-
tivated questions. is can lead to clearer answers and bring into relief new
theoretical possibilities and avenues to explore.
*anks to Eric Swanson and the audience at the Fih Annual Arizona Normative Ethics Work-
shop for discussion, and to two anonymous referees for comments.
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 Introduction
e strategy of clarifying philosophical questions by investigating the language we
use to express them is familiar. Debates about intentionality shi to debates about
sentences that report intentionality; debates about knowledge shi to debates about
‘knows’; debates about reference and singular thought shi to debates about refer-
ential expressions and attitude ascriptions. Such “semantic ascent,” as Quine (:
§) famously held, can help build common ground in debates that become seem-
ingly intractable. A natural thought is that a similar strategy might be helpful in
ethics. Perhaps by examining ethical language we can make progress in resolving
conĘicting basic moral intuitions and seemingly intractable disputes about funda-
mental normative principles. Perhaps. But if you are skeptical about how a substan-
tive normative rabbit could possibly be drawn out of a linguistic hat, I am sympa-
thetic. I won’t be trying to do any such thing.
en what will I be doing? Consider Ernie. Ernie is a budding ethicist. He is
sincere in his inquiries on what to do and how to live. ough convinced that some
ways of acting are better or worse than others, he has trouble shaking the following
argument:
. When making moral claims speakers express emotions and sensibilities.
. Factual claims don’t express emotions or sensibilities.
. So, moral claims aren’t about matters of fact.
. So, there are no moral facts.
. So, everything is permitted.
is is a bad argument. One might point to ordinary factual judgments that ex-
press emotions; or seek clariĕcation about the quantiĕcational and modal force of
the claims in Premises  and ; or question the inference from Step  to Step ,
and wonder how everything could be permitted if there were no moral facts; and so
on. Details aside, what is important for the moment is that highly contentious as-
sumptions about moral and non-moral language are being used to support a radical
substantive normative conclusion. Debates about ground-level issues can oen be-
come intertwined with debates about the language we use to talk about them; ethics
is no exception. By clearing up Ernie’s assumptions about moral language, we can
free up his investigations in how to live.

eways in which assumptions about normative language can ĕgure in substan-
tive normative arguments are multifarious and complex. e language questions
can be diﬃcult enough as is, even bracketing how they bear on the ground-level
questions of primary concern. But there is progress to be made.
In this paper I will examine two dimensions along which normative language
can diﬀer: “strength” (§) and “subjectivity” (§) (this terminology will be clari-
ĕed in due course). Particular attention will be given to deontic necessity modals,
i.e. deontic uses of modal verbs like ‘ought’, ‘must’, ‘should’, ‘have to’, etc. Next I
will show how better appreciating these features of normative language can improve
theorizing about three issues in ethics: the coherence of moral dilemmas (§), the
possibility of supererogatory acts (§), and the connection between making a nor-
mative judgment and being motivated to act accordingly (§). e discussions of
these speciĕc linguistic and ethical issues can be seen as case studies illustrating the
fruitfulness of utilizing resources from philosophy of language and linguistics in
ethical theorizing. Of course, one could acknowledge a role for linguistic inquiry in
ethics but reject my speciĕc claims about its import on the debates to be discussed.
I would like to convince you on the latter philosophical issues as well. At mini-
mum, though, I hope to encourage healthy skepticism about simplifying assump-
tions that bracket diﬀerences among normative terms; about the degree to which we
can investigate normative concepts unaﬀected by idiosyncrasies of the language we
use to express those concepts; and even perhaps about the theoretical utility of the
distinction—at least so-called—between “normative” vs. “non-normative” terms,
concepts, and judgments.
ere is a sense in which the above general methodological points are unobjec-
tionable. Lots of things may improve theorizing—perhaps eating more ice cream,
for example (Feuerbach notwithstanding). Fair enough. But I suspect that issues
concerning normative language constitute a more general source of ethical malaise.
For many purposes, bracketing diﬀerences among normative terms may be harm-
less. But not always. Insensitivity to diﬀerences among normative terms has ob-
scured debates on a range of ethical issues. Getting clearer on the language we
use when investigating these issues can improve theorizing about them—e.g., by
helping us diagnose problems with bad arguments and formulate better motivated
questions. is can lead to clearer answers and bring into relief new theoretical pos-
sibilities and avenues to explore.

 Weak and strong necessity
e notion of “obligation” is central in moral philosophy. It isn’t uncommon to treat
various expressions— e.g., ‘obligation’, ‘duty’, ‘ought’, ‘right’, ‘required’, ‘must’— as
equivalent, or at least roughly equivalent, for the purposes of expressing this central
notion. Indeed, Richard Brandt begins his investigation of the concepts of duty and
obligation by observing as much: “Philosophers oen use the following expressions
as approximate equivalents: ‘It is X’s duty to do A’; ‘It is obligatory for X to do A’;
‘It would be wrong for X not to do A’; and ‘X ought to do A’ ” (B : ).
Here are some representative examples:
When we are talking about someone’s duty or what he ought to do, we
oen express this by saying that he has a “moral obligation” to do it.
(S : I/.)
[I]t is clear that by [‘this is the right act’] we mean ‘this is the act that
ought to be done’, ‘this act ismorally obligatory’. (R : )
“I have an obligation to” means no more, and no less, than “I ought to.”
(S : n.)
In deontic logic it is standard to treat these expressions as equivalent for the pur-
poses of interpreting the◯-operator, along with the operators with which it is in-
terdeĕned. Here are von Wright and Åqvist:
ere are the deonticmodes ormodes of obligation. ese are concepts
such as the obligatory (that which we ought to do)—and the forbidden
(that which we must not do). (W : )
[D]eontic logic… is the logical study of the normative use of language
and… its subject matter is a variety of normative concepts, notably
those of obligation (prescription), prohibition (forbiddance), permission
and commitment. e ĕrst one among these concepts is oen expressed
by such words as ‘shall’, ‘ought’ and ‘must’, the second by ‘shall not’,
‘ought not’ and ‘must not’, and the third one by ‘may’; the fourth no-
tion amounts to an idea of conditional obligation, expressible by ‘if…,
then it shall (ought, must) be the case that _ _ _’. (Å : )
ere is something to the assumption that ‘Ought ’, ‘Must ’, etc. uniformly express
that  is necessary in some sense related to obligation. But it is false.

ere is a robust body of linguistic evidence supporting a distinction in strength
among necessity modals, with so-called “weak” necessity modals (‘ought’, ‘should’,
‘be supposed to’), on the one hand, and “strong” necessity modals (‘must’, ‘have to’,
‘(have) got to’, ‘be required to’), on the other. ‘Ought’— ethics’s beloved term of
obligation, and deontic logic’s necessity modal par excellence—is relegated to the
same “medium” category of modality as ‘appear’ and ‘seem’ (H & P-
 : ). When Kant wrote “I ought [sollen] never to act except in such a way
that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (: :), I
doubt he was intending to be hedging his bets. Kant notwithstanding, it is well es-
tablished in descriptive and theoretical linguistics that although modals like (say)
‘ought’ and ‘should’ are stronger than modals like ‘may’ and ‘can’, they are weaker
than modals like ‘must’ and ‘have to’. One piece of evidence is that, even holding the
readings of the modals ĕxed, the former can be followed by the latter, but not vice
versa, as reĘected in ().
() a. I ought to help the poor. In fact, I must.
b. I must help the poor. In fact, I ought to.
Similarly, (a) is consistent in a way that (b) is not.
() a. I should help the poor, but I don’t have to.
b. I must help the poor, but it’s not as if I should.
ese contrasts are similar in character to thosewith quantiĕers of diﬀering strengths,
as reĘected in ()–().
() a. Some of the children came to the party. In fact, all of them did.
b. All of the children came to the party. In fact, some of them did.
See, among many others, L , ; H , ; L ; C ;
W ; P , ; B  . ; G ; M ;
Z ; S ; H & P ; W ; C ;
W ;  F & I ; L ; R ; S . For
precedents in ethics and logic, see also S ; W ; H , ;
W ; W c; J & P ; MN . How to capture
this distinction in strength is less well established; see, e.g.,  F & I , F
, L , S , R , S .
I use ‘’ to mark infelicity and ‘?’ to indicate that using the marked item is dispreferred; so, ‘?’
marks a weaker infelicity than ‘’. For ease of exposition I will treat ‘’, ‘ ’, etc. as schematic letters to
be replaced sometimes with sentences, sometimes with verb phrases. Either way, this is neutral on
whether the arguments of deontic modals are propositions or properties (actions).

() a. Some, but not all, of the children came to the party.
b. All, but not some, of the children came to the party.
(is isn’t to say that the diﬀerence between weak and strong necessity modals is to
be captured speciĕcally in terms of quantiĕer strength. e present point is simply
that there is a contrast in strength, however it is to be captured.)
A not uncommon intuition is that part of this diﬀerence in strength is traceable
to a diﬀerence in what possibilities the modals leave open. Informally, ‘ought’ and
‘should’ make claims about what is ideal or “best” in some relevant sense but leave
open whether there may be acceptable alternatives, whereas ‘must’ and ‘have to’ im-
ply that there are no acceptable alternatives. As Bernard Williams puts it, “Ought is
related to must as best is related to only” (W c: ; cf. S ,
MN ,  F & I , ). If you are getting over a
cold and I say ‘You should stay home and rest’, I suggest that resting would be best,
but I seem to leave open whether there may be alternative ways for you to get better.
But if I say ‘You must stay home and rest’, I imply that resting is the only way for you
to get better. Similarly, if I say ‘You should give  of your income to the poor’,
I seem to leave open whether there may be a permissible course of action for you
that involves your giving less. But if I say ‘You must give  of your income to the
poor’, I exclude such a possibility.
‘Ought’ and ‘should’ diﬀer from ‘must’ in more naturally allowing for the non-
actualization of their prejacents, or the possibility that the obligation in questionwill
go unsatisĕed. (In ‘MODAL ’, ‘’ is the prejacent of the modal.) Suppose I am a
smoker. I am aware of all the health risks, but, given my resistance to change, I ĕnd
it unlikely that I will quit. I say:
() I should stop smoking, but I’m not going to.
Or suppose we are talking about Alice, and I mention that Alice lied to her partner
about where she was last night. Given Alice’s tendency to avoid conĘict, I say:
() I’m not sure if Alice will come clean, but she should.
Intuitively, in uttering () I am communicating that I won’t do what would be best
for my health. In uttering () I am saying that Alice is obliged to come clean to her
partner, while expressing doubts aboutwhether shewill do so. ere is a robust body
of data that speakers ĕnd it less natural to express these thoughts by using ‘must’, as

reĘected in ()–().
() I must stop smoking, but I’m not going to.
() ?I’m not sure if Alice will come clean, but she must.
Uttering ‘Must ’ not only conveys that¬-possibilities are unacceptable; it suggests
that¬-possibilities aren’t even on the table for consideration. Of course obligations
can go unfulĕlled. What is interesting is that speakers appear to assume otherwise,
at least for the purposes of conversation, when expressing obligations with ‘must’.
ese diﬀerences between weak and strong necessity modals aﬀect the circum-
stances inwhich they can be felicitously used (see R , S , 
for extensive recent discussion). Suppose you are considering whether to ĕght in
the Resistance or take care of your ailing mother. You mention that the value of
family, which supports your helping your mother over your ĕghting, is important,
and I agree. But the issue is acknowledged to be complex, and it isn’t settled in the
context whether there might be more important competing values. Sensitive to this,
I may ĕnd it more appropriate to express my advice that you help your mother by
using ‘should’ than by using ‘must’, as in ().
() You: Family is very important.
Me: I agree. You should (/?must, /?have to) take care of your mother.
But if we settle that family is of primary importance, as in (), it can become more
natural to use ‘must’ and for us to accept that you have to help your mother.
() You: Family is most important—more important than country or any-
thing else.
Me: I agree. You must (/have to, /?should) take care of your mother.
How I express my advice that you help your mother depends on the status in the
context of the value of family vis-à-vis other potentially relevant values. In (),
where it is settled that the value of family is to take precedence, using a strong ne-
cessity modal is preferred. But in (), where this condition isn’t settled, were I to
use ‘must’ I would imply that I am foreclosing certain possibilities that you have le
See, e.g., L , L , W , H , L ,
W c, C , G , P , , S , M
, H & P , H & T , W , N ,
L  . , P , C & A , S .
See W : ch.  and MN : ch.  for prescient early discussion
of the context-dependence of ‘ought’ and ‘must’.

open. Unless I am in a position to do so, my using ‘must’ is dispreferred. By using
‘should’ I can propose that you help your mother while leaving open the possibility
that the value of family might be outweighed or defeated in some way. If you accept
my ‘should’ claim, we can plan accordingly without having to presuppose that the
value of family is more important than other competing values we accept or may
come to accept.
In light of these logical and conversational diﬀerences between weak and strong
necessity modals, it is perhaps unsurprising that they are oen thought to diﬀer in
their directive force. Paul McNamara puts the intuition well:
To say that one ought to take a certain option is merely to provide a
nudge in that direction. Its typical uses are to oﬀer guidance, a word
to the wise (“counsel of wisdom”), to recommend, advise or prescribe
a course of action… In contrast, to say that one must take a certain
option is to be quite forceful. Its typical uses are to command, decree,
enact, exhort, entreat, require, regulate, legislate, delegate, or warn. Its
directive force is quite strong. (MN : )
Informally, using a strong necessity modal is oen more emphatic and expresses
greater urgency than using a weak necessity modal.
In this section we have seen a dimension of strength along which deontic neces-
sity modals can diﬀer. Following the descriptive and formal linguistic work I have
treated the relevant distinction as a binary one (weak vs. strong). ere are indeed
good linguistic reasons, even beyond those given here, for marking a distinction
at this level (e.g., concerning neg-raising and interactions with quantiĕers, among
other things; see n. ). Yet for all I have said here the distinction may be more ĕne-
grained than this. What is important for my purposes is simply that there is some
relevant diﬀerence in strength among necessity modals.
In the next section we will examine a second dimension of diﬀerence among
deontic modals. But ĕrst I want to emphasize the modesty of my aims in these sec-
tions. I am not oﬀering an account of how to capture these features of normative
language (though see §); I take up that task in other work (S ). My char-
acterizations of the linguistic phenomena are intentionally informal. Also, for all I
See also esp. N , P , , S . See also B , L ,
, , L ,W , C , P , B  . ,M ,
, H & P , S , N  . .
anks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.

say in these sections, the highlighted diﬀerences in normative language may be ir-
relevant for the purposes of normative inquiry. I leave argument that having these
diﬀerences in view can improve normative theorizing to §§–.
 Endorsing and non-endorsing uses
Following L , it is common in linguistic semantics to distinguish “subjec-
tive” and “objective” uses of modals. Very roughly, a modal is used subjectively if
it presents the speaker as endorsing the considerations with respect to which the
modal claim would be true. A modal is used objectively if it doesn’t present the
speaker in this way. Applied to the normative case, a deontic modal is used sub-
jectively if it presents the speaker as endorsing a body of relevant norms that would
justify it, and objectively if it doesn’t. Use of the labels ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ can
be fraught in ethical theory. So let’s call Lyons’s “subjective” uses of modals endorsing
uses, and call Lyons’s “objective” uses non-endorsing uses. Note that non-endorsing
uses are compatible with speaker endorsement; they simply fail to present it.
Our second dimension alongwhich normative terms can diﬀer concerns the fre-
quencywithwhich they are used in an endorsing or non-endorsingmanner. Among
strong necessity modals, ‘be required to’ is typically used non-endorsingly; ‘have to’
and ‘(have) got to’ are more Ęexible, with ‘have to’ tending more toward the non-
endorsing side of the spectrum and ‘(have) got to’ more toward the endorsing side;
and ‘must’ is nearly always used endorsingly. Among weak necessity modals, ‘be
supposed to’ is typically used non-endorsingly; ‘be to’ is more Ęexible; and ‘should’
and ‘ought’ are nearly always used endorsingly.
ese claims are supported by examples which target whether the speaker can
coherently follow her sincere modal utterance with an expression of indiﬀerence
toward or disapproval of the norms that would verify it (n. ). For expository pur-
poses, let’s focus on the cases of ‘must’, ‘have to’, ‘should’, and ‘be supposed to’. It is
hard to hear a sincere utterance of ‘Must ’ as consistent with the speaker’s being
indiﬀerent about  or about the relevant norms according to which  is required, as
reĘected in ().
ese generalizations are supported by a robust body of data in descriptive linguistics. See
L , , , L a,b, L , L , C , P ,
, S , M , , N , V , H & P-
 , S . See also S , S  for discussion. It is interesting to consider
related distinctions in ethics, deontic logic, and philosophy of law in light of this linguistic work; cf.,
e.g., H , H /, S ,  W , H , R .
Terminology varies among authors.

() [Context: Some friends are deciding whether to go home or stay out late
for the party.]
a. You must get home by , but I don’t care whether you do.
b. Bert must get home by . Aren’t his parents stupid? I would stay out
if I were him.
We ĕnd similar judgments for utterances with the weak necessity modal ‘should’:
() a. You should get home by , but I don’t care whether you do.
b. Bert should get home by . Aren’t his parents stupid? I would stay
out if I were him.
Two clariĕcations are in order. First, endorsing uses are compatiblewith the speaker’s
being torn, or feeling the force of competing values or reasons. Suppose Bert’s
mother just went to the hospital for a medical emergency. If Bert’s friend asks him
whether he will be at the party, he might sincerely say:
() I wish I could go, but I {must, should} help my mother.
Second, endorsing uses are compatible with the speaker’s treating the normativity
of the relevant norms as grounded in an external source. Suppose Chip is a sincere,
practicing Catholic. His uttering () is compatible with his taking his obligation to
go to confession as being grounded in the authority of God or the Church.
() I {must, should} go to confession.
Chip’s use of ‘must’ or ‘should’ is endorsing in the sense that it presents him as
endorsing or identifying with the norms that entail this obligation, whatever their
source.
Even with these points in mind, judgments like those in ()–() aren’t nearly
as anomalous when expressed with the strong necessity modal ‘have to’ or the weak
necessity modal ‘be supposed to’.
() a. You have to get home by , but I don’t care whether you do.
b. Bert has to get home by . Aren’t his parents stupid? I would stay out
if I were him.
() a. You’re supposed to get home by , but I don’t care whether you do.
b. Bert is supposed to get home by . Aren’t his parents stupid? I would
stay out if I were him.

Intuitively, in ()–() it is coherent for the speaker to dismiss the act of getting
home by  because she isn’t endorsing the norms that entail that the subject has
this obligation. She is simply reporting what is required by them.
To be clear, these claims about patterns of (non-)endorsing use for particu-
lar modal expressions aren’t exceptionless principles. For instance, the claim isn’t
that ‘must’ can’t be used non-endorsingly. Some speakers may allow non-speaker-
enorsing uses in certain contexts; adding explicit adverbial phrases like ‘morally’ or
‘legally’ can also promote non-endorsing readings. e generalization supported
by the evidence is rather that ‘must’ is typically used endorsingly (see S 
for further discussion). What is important is that modal expressions diﬀer in their
tendencies toward endorsing vs. non-endorsing use.
Wehave seen twodistinctions in themeaning anduse of deontic necessitymodals.
ese distinctions crosscut one another. Some examples are given in Table :
Table : Strength and (non-)endorsingness
endorsing non-endorsing
weak ‘should’/‘ought’ ‘be to’ ‘be supposed to’
strong ‘must’ ‘(have) got to’ ‘have to’ ‘be required to’
We ĕnd strong necessity modals that tend to be used endorsingly, like ‘must’; strong
necessity modals that tend to be used non-endorsingly, like ‘be required to’; weak
necessitymodals that tend to be used endorsingly, like ‘ought’ and ‘should’; andweak
necessity modals that tend to be used non-endorsingly, like ‘be supposed to’. ese
are certainly not the only respects in which deontic necessity modals and normative
language diﬀer in their meaning and use. Yet in the remainder of the paper I will
argue that greater sensitivity to these speciĕc dimensions along which normative
language diﬀers can illuminate various normative ethical debates.
anks to Eric Swanson for impressing onme the importance of this point. See S ,
S  for discussion.
See, e.g., C , P , C , B  . , M , ,
, H & P ; L , S , L  . , C & A
, I & Z .

 Dilemmas
Suppose you promised Alice that you would help her move and promised Bert that
you would help him move, but you discover that you cannot help them both. Sup-
pose also that each promise is uniquely important, and there is no higher-order
principle you can use to resolve whom to help. On the face of it, you are in a moral
or practical dilemma. But some have argued that genuine dilemmas— irresolvable
conĘicts in what to do, all-things-considered—are impossible.
On the one hand, it isn’t uncommon for arguments against the existence of
dilemmas to be motivated by the thought that it is inconsistent for contrary acts
to be simultaneously required. It would seem inconsistent for you to be required to
help Alice and required to help Bert when you cannot help them both. Morality, or
rationality, could never land us in such a contradiction. As Kant puts it— in only
the way he can:
But since duty and obligation are concepts that express the objective
practical necessity of certain actions and two rules opposed to each other
cannot be necessary at the same time, if it is a duty to act in accordance
with one rule, to act in accordance with the opposite rule is not a duty
but even contrary to duty; so a collision of duties and obligations is in-
conceivable. (K : :)
More recently, here is Alan Donagan:
Rationalist theories cannot allowmoral dilemmas…Each principle and
each derivative proposition of a rationalist theory asserts, of some rule
or precept that it assumes all human beings can observe in all situations
towhich that rule or precept applies, that practical reason requires them
all to observe it. If, therefore, any such theory were to assert that prac-
tical reason requires any human being in any situation to observe a set
of precepts that cannot all be observed in it, it would contradict itself;
for it would assert that set of precepts not to be what it also asserts or
assumes them to be. (D : )
ough see H  for an interpretation of Kant on which dilemmas are possible.
See also R , D , S , H , C , D ,
F , T , P , B , MC , Z
. See G  and MC  for survey discussions.

On the other hand, there is a long tradition in ethics and logic that is compelled by
the thought that it is at least coherent to think that ‘Ought ’ and ‘Ought  ’ might
both be true, for contraries ‘’ and ‘ ’. Here is van Fraassen:
I shall conclude that the view [that sometimes there are two sound
moral arguments, concluding respectively that A ought to be the case
(O(A)) and that not-A ought to be the case (O(~A))] constitutes a sig-
niĕcant ethical position (whether correct or incorrect). ( F
: )
Even if, fortuitously, there are no moral or practical dilemmas, the possibility of
dilemmas shouldn’t be ruled out by the very meanings of normative terms.
Attending to diﬀerences among necessity modals can help us capture both of
these intuitions. Many ĕnd it plausible that the dilemmas expressed with ‘should’
and ‘have to’ in ()–() are consistent in a way that the dilemma expressed with
‘must’ in () is not.
() I should help Alice and I should help Bert, but I can’t help them both.
() I have to help Alice and I have to help Bert, but I can’t help them both.
() ?I must help Alice and I must help Bert, but I can’t help them both.
We can capture this in terms of the distinction between endorsing andnon-endorsing
uses of modals, and independent work on the semantics of weak necessity modals.
We saw in § that ‘have to’ tends toward non-endorsing uses—uses that fail
to present the speaker as endorsing the relevant verifying norms. Insofar as the
‘have to’s in () are used non-endorsingly and are interpreted with respect to dis-
tinct moral considerations, it is unsurprising that some speakers naturally hear ()
as consistent. ere needn’t be any inconsistency in saying (roughly) that the one
promise requires one action and that the other promise requires another action, as-
suming one isn’t expressing endorsement of either requirement. But if we use a
strong necessity modal like ‘must’ that tends toward endorsing uses, the sense of
inconsistency becomes more palpable. e speaker is more naturally heard as reg-
istering endorsement of an inconsistent set of norms and as directing one to perform
incompatible acts (given the facts about the scenario).
See also, e.g., L ,  F , W , B M ,
F , G , S-A , D , H , H ,
, G , S .
See, e.g., L , G , H , S ; cf. F ,
S-A , H ,  F .

Interestingly, many speakers ĕnd the sense of inconsistency to dissipate when
the dilemma is expressed with ‘should’, as in (), even when the modals are given
a constant interpretation and are used endorsingly. is contrast between ‘should’
and ‘must’ is nicely predicted by several recent independently motivated semantics
which validate agglomeration for strong necessity modals but not for weak necessity
modals (S , S , ). On these semantics ‘Must’ and ‘Must ’
entail ‘Must ( and  )’, but ‘Should ’ and ‘Should  ’ don’t entail ‘Should ( and
 )’. e formal details would take us too far aĕeld; interested readers may consult
the references above. What is important for our purposes is simply that there are
independent reasons for thinking that genuine dilemmas are coherently expressible
with weak necessitymodals— i.e., that ‘Should’ and ‘Should ’ could both be true,
for contraries ‘’ and ‘ ’. Whereas () implies that I must do the impossible, ()
does not.
e examples in ()–() suggest that dilemmas are coherently expressible with
non-endorsing uses of strongnecessitymodals andwith (endorsing or non-endorsing)
uses of weak necessity modals. What import could this point about our linguistic
judgments possibly have for normative theory? First, arguments that there are no
genuine dilemmas will need to be independent of appeals to linguistic intuitions
like the intuition that () is inconsistent. e theorist who accepts that there are
genuine dilemmas can agree with Kant that incompatible propositions cannot both
be deontically necessary: ‘Must ’ and ‘Must  ’, for contraries ‘’ and ‘ ’, are in-
consistent. But this doesn’t itself show that the concept of a dilemma is incoherent.
Dilemmas are coherently expressible— just not with endorsing uses of strong neces-
sity modals. Even if there are no practical dilemmas, this isn’t because they “entail
a contradiction” (D : ).
To be clear, I am not claiming that the linguistic data tells us something about
whether there are genuine practical dilemmas. To the contrary. My aim is to bring
the debate about dilemmas back to the ethicist’s home turf. Whether there are gen-
uine dilemmas is a question for substantive normative theory, not logic or semantics.
e intuitive worry about dilemmas isn’t a linguistic one. It is about whether one
might ĕnd oneself in a certain sort of situation—perhaps a situation where compet-
ing values with whichwe identify pull us in opposite directions; or a situationwhere,
no matter what we do, we cannot help but feel loss. As is now generally accepted,
all parties in the debate about dilemmas can accept that these sorts of situations are
possible. e question has become whether some such apparent dilemmas consti-
tute “genuine” dilemmas. e issue is what this question amounts to. We can now
see that we cannot simply ask whether morality or rationality could land us in a sit-
uation in which we couldn’t satisfy all its “demands” or “obligations.” Couching the

question in these terms partitions the space of normative possibilities too coarsely.
Likewise, we cannot put the question as whether we could ĕnd ourselves in a situ-
ation in which we should  and we should  , or in which we must  and we must
 , where we cannot both  and  . Couching the question in these terms may leave
our answer aﬀected by orthogonal linguistic issues. Instead, perhaps the question is
whether there can be incomparable values or sets of reasons for an agent that enjoin
incompatible acts; or whether it is possible that, all things considered, possibilities
where the agent s are incomparable to possibilities where the agent  s (and the
agent can’t both  and  ), and no possibility where the agent s better satisĕes the
total body of normative factors; or… What is important here isn’t whether these
are the precise normative questions that lie behind our vague initial worries about
the possibility of practical dilemmas. What is important is that they are normative
questions.
What language we use in posing normative questions is crucial. Greater sensi-
tivity to how we express and talk about dilemmas can help us frame the questions
directing our inquiry in ways that track the substantive normative issues of primary
concern. Progress in the debate over practical dilemmas needn’t be sidetracked by
arguments turning on the idiosyncrasies of particular normative terms.
 Supererogation
Supererogatory acts are acts that go “beyond the call of duty.” ey are permitted but
not required, and better than what is minimally required. ink: throwing yourself
on a grenade to protect your friends, giving a substantial portion of your income to
the poor, and so on.
Some ethicists (“anti-supererogationists”) claim that there are no supereroga-
tory acts, and that acts that seem to be supererogatory are in fact required. Others
(“qualiĕed supererogationists”) grant that there are supererogatory acts, but main-
tain that these acts are still binding in some sense and thus deserving of criticism if
not performed. e following is a not uncommon line of argument: “It would be
“Deontic necessity is commonly glossed as ‘obligation’, but the noun obligation covers the range
of should as well as must” (H & P : ); cf. Sloman’s (: ) prescient
similar observation that the “contrast between ‘ought’ and ‘must’ is obliterated by referring to both
as cases of ‘obligation’.”
is terminology follows H . For classic examples of anti-supererogationism, see
M , N , F , K . For classic examples of qualiĕed supereroga-
tionism, see R , R , R . See U  for the seminal work that
prompted contemporary interest in supererogation. See H  and M  for exten-

much better if I gave more money to the poor. I really ought to do so. So, I must
have conclusive reason, and hence an obligation, to give more to the poor. So, my
not giving more to the poor must be wrong and hence subject to criticism.” (“And
so,” the anti-supererogationist would add, “my giving more to the poor must not be
supererogatory aer all.”) is argument generalizes, leading to the so-called “para-
dox of supererogation,” or “good-ought tie-up.” JosephRaz articulates theworrywell
(see also n. ):
If doing a supererogatory act is praiseworthy there must be reasons for
doing it, and the reasons must outweigh any conĘicting reasons for not
doing it. But if there are conclusive reasons for performing the act then
not to perform it is to act against the balance of reasons. If reason
requires that the act be done then surely one ought to do it, and the
“ought” is based on all the reasons which apply to the case; it is a con-
clusive ought. But this entails that failing to perform the act is failing
to do what one ought (conclusively) to do, so why isn’t it blameworthy
not to perform a supererogatory act? (R : )
ere are several things to be distinguished in this line of argument— e.g., what
is good, what is blameworthy, what one ought to do, what one has most reason to
do, what one is required to do. e crucial inferences are from the claim that one
has most reason to  to the claim that one has an obligation to , and from this to
the claim that it would be wrong or blameworthy not to . Raz himself presents the
argument in terms of ‘conclusive ought’, but this, of course, is philosopher-speak.
e relevant question is what notion of obligation or normative necessity it is being
used to express. e problem is that not all ways of ĕlling this in are equally com-
pelling or speak against supererogationism. e anti-supererogationist gets traction
with the intuition that failing to do what one must do, or is required to do, leaves
one subject to criticism. But the fact that it would be better for you to give more to
the poor, and even that you should, needn’t imply that you must. While it is plausi-
ble that failing to do what one must is blameworthy, it is less obvious that one may
always be blamed for failing to do what is good or what one should. By clarifying the
distinction between weak and strong necessity, we can see how it is at least coherent
for a moral view (a) to distinguish what one ought to do and what would be best
from what one must do and what is minimally required, and (b) to attach blame or
criticism to failing to do the latter.
sive discussion.
Cf. S , MN .

ese points don’t show that there are supererogatory acts any more than the
considerations in § showed that there are genuine practical dilemmas. Perhaps the
critics of supererogationism are right and nothing but the best will do. One might
accept on independent grounds a demanding moral theory according to which one
must dowhat is evaluatively best. But such groundswill have to be just that: indepen-
dent. Additional substantive normative argument will be required. Distinguishing
notions of normative necessity can reĕne our understanding of the space of possible
theories and suggest new ways the dialectic may proceed.
Various accounts of weak necessity are motivated by the thought that weak ne-
cessitymodals are, in some sense, interpretedwith respect to additional facts, values,
norms, etc. ese accounts shed light on two thoughts that many have had about
supererogation: ĕrst, that it is only a select few, perhaps those who have some sort of
“higher calling,” who ought to perform supererogatory acts; and, second, that many
agents who perform supererogatory acts regard these acts as things they must do.
For concreteness, I will focus on the particular account of weak necessity which I
have developed elsewhere (S , ). What makes weak necessity modals
“weak,” on this view, is that they bracket whether the necessity claim holds in the
actual world. ‘Should’ expresses necessity only on the supposition that certain cir-
cumstances relevant to the necessity claim obtain. It needn’t be presupposed that
these circumstances actually do obtain. Suppose I promised an acquaintance, Al-
ice, that I would help her move. Intuitively, a norm requiring that I help Alice is in
force only if certain circumstances obtain— e.g., that I don’t come across a drown-
ing child on the way to Alice’s apartment, that an evil dictator didn’t promise to
torture hundreds of children if I help Alice, etc. Very roughly, saying that I must
help Alice implies that all such circumstances obtain and thus that I am actually re-
quired to help her. Saying that I should help Alice implies only that were all such
conditions to be satisĕed, I would be required to help her. Weak necessity modals
aﬀord a means of coordinating on the implications of our norms and values with-
out having to decisively settle on how they apply and weigh against one another in
See, e.g.,  F & I , R , S , . How precisely this
thought is implemented varies among accounts.
e ĕrst point has a long tradition of support, especially in theological literatures on su-
pererogation; see H : ch. , M : ch.  and references therein. On the second
point, see, e.g., U , E . Concerning the “righteous gentiles” he interviewed
from Le Chambon who protected Jews from Nazis, Philip Hallie relates that they invariably “pulled
back fromme but looked ĕrmly into my eyes and said: ‘How can you call us “good”? We were doing
what had to be done’ ” (H : , cited in H & T : n.).
ese developments diﬀer in technical implementation; these diﬀerenceswon’t be relevant here.

particular circumstances.
I won’t attempt to defend this view here. Suﬃce it to say that it may help capture
the two additional ideas about supererogation noted above. First, suppose there
are conditional norms to the eﬀect that one s if one desires greater merit, has a
higher calling, has a special dispensation of divine grace, or the like. Call these
norms supererogation norms and the possible conditions under which they apply
supererogation conditions. Even if it isn’t decisively settled whether Dorothy “has a
higher calling” or the like, we might accept that Dorothy should , or that her -ing
would be supererogatory. is is possible even if Dorothy doesn’t in fact satisfy any
supererogation condition and ‘Dorothy must ’ is false. Moreover insofar as agents
in general fail to satisfy the supererogation conditions, the generic claim ‘One must
’ will be false. is reĘects a sense in which the act of -ing is supererogatory.
Second, given that agents are typically in a position to settle on whether they
satisfy the above sorts of conditions—whether they desire greater merit, etc.— it is
unsurprising that those who perform supererogatory acts sometimes regard them as
things they must do. In saying ‘I must ’ the agent assumes that the supererogatory
norms apply to her. Even if she is correct about this, the act of -ing may still be
supererogatory in the above sense that the generic claim ‘One must ’ is false. But
there is also a sense in which her act may be supererogatory for her. For even if she is
among the select few, the fact that she is may itself be the result of some supereroga-
tory act(s). Perhaps her wanting to “go beyond the call” is good but not required of
her. If so, then even if she must , it isn’t the case that she must be such that she must
. Her being such that -ing is required for her is itself supererogatory. ough she
is “just doing her duty,” that it is her duty renders her deserving of praise.
 Judgment internalism and “the normative”
It is oen claimed that a distinctive mark of normative language and judgment is
its practical character, or its connection with action and motivation. is connec-
tion between normative language and action is epitomized in the thesis of judgment
internalism— to a ĕrst approximation, the claim that there is an internal and nec-
essary connection between making a normative judgment and being motivated to
act in accordance with it. Here are Allan Gibbard and Ralph Wedgwood:
e clear distinctive feature of normative concepts, I now think, lies in
For classic discussions, see F , N , W a, K , D-
 .

their conceptual ties. Oughts of action tie in conceptually with acting.
(G : )
[T]he necessary connection that normative judgments have to motiva-
tion and practical reasoning is a special feature of normative and eval-
uative judgments. It is a feature that is absent from all judgments that
are wholly non-normative and non-evaluative in content. Indeed, this
seems to be precisely one of the features that distinguishes normative
and evaluative judgments from judgments of all other kinds. (W-
 : )
Many take it as obvious that some form of internalism is true. Aer all, the reasons
we weigh in deliberation are reasons for action, i.e., reasons for acting on. Normative
judgments are constitutive of deliberation, and deliberation is essentially practical;
its aim is action. But many ĕnd there to be clear counterexamples. What about the
psychopath? Or someone who is really tired or depressed? Can’t they make sincere
normative judgments while lacking the corresponding motivation?
Attending to our twodimensions of diﬀerence amongnecessitymodals— strength
and patterns of (non)-endorsing use— can illuminate theorists’ conĘicting intu-
itions about judgment internalism. e continuation of the above quote from Gib-
bard is revealing.
e clear distinctive feature of normative concepts, I now think, lies in
their conceptual ties. Oughts of action tie in conceptually with acting.
Take, for example, the belief that the building is on ĕre and the one and
only way to keep from being burned to a crisp is to leave forthwith. If
that’s the case, we’d better leave forthwith, but it isn’t strictly incoherent,
conceptually, to have this belief and not to leave. Contrast this with
the normative belief that one must leave forthwith. It is, I maintain,
conceptually incoherent to hold this belief and not leave, if one can.
(G : ; emphasis in original)
It is revealing that Gibbard uses ‘must’ to pump the intuition that normative beliefs
are conceptually tied with action. Deontic ‘must’ is nearly always used with directive
force in main clauses (§§–). It is thus no surprise that judgment internalism will
seem compelling when considering deontic ‘must’ judgments. It is hard to hear a
sincere utterance of ‘Must ’ as consistent with the speaker’s being indiﬀerent about
, as reĘected in () and (), reproduced in ().
() a. I must get home by , but forget that; I’m not going to.

b. You must get home by , but I don’t care whether you do.
c. Bert must get home by . Aren’t his parents stupid? I would stay out
if I were him.
But the same sorts of judgments aren’t nearly as anomalous when expressed with
necessity modals that are more naturally used non-endorsingly, as reĘected in ()–
(), reproduced in (). Interestingly, ‘be to’, in terms of which G 
and W  analyze all normative terms, isn’t conventionally endorsing
(L a).
() a. {I’m supposed to, I have to, I’m to} get home by , but forget that;
I’m not going to.
b. {You’re supposed to, You have to, You’re to} get home by , but I don’t
care whether you do.
c. {Bert is supposed to, Bert has to, Bert is to} get home by . Aren’t
his parents stupid? I would stay out if I were him.
We needn’t be psychopaths to sincerely utter the sentences in ().
We saw in § that theweaknecessitymodal ‘should’ is typically used endorsingly:
() a. You should get home by , but I don’t care whether you do.
b. Bert should get home by . Aren’t his parents stupid? I would stay
out if I were him.
However, even when used endorsingly, weak necessity modals are compatible with
the denials of their prejacents, as we saw in ().
() I should stop smoking, but I’m not going to.
is latter featuremay inĘuence intuitions about apparent counterexamples to judg-
ment internalism involving judgments expressed with weak necessity modals.
We should be wary of general claims about normative language and judgment.
Judgment internalism can seemcompellingwhen considering judgments using terms
that are paradigmatically directive and endorsing. But when we consider judgments
using other terms, counterexamples can appear in the oﬃng. Even if internalism is
true for deontic ‘must’ judgments, it is false for judgments expressed using terms
that aren’t conventionally endorsing.
Objection: “is conclusion is dialectically irrelevant. Judgment internalism is,
as the name suggests, a thesis about normative judgment, a species of mental act
that involves deployment of a distinctive sort of concept. e question of judgment

internalism is a question about the connection between judgments of this sort and
motivation. Whether certain natural language sentences invariably express this kind
of judgment, and whether accepting such sentences is invariably connected with
motivation, is beside the point.”
is is an important objection. One response would be to call into question the
implicit assumption that we can get a grip on the nature of normative judgments
and concepts independently of the language we use to express them. One might
worry that if linguistically driven intuitions about cases were an unreliable, insuﬃ-
cient, or even irrelevant source of evidence, our metaethical accounts of normative
judgment would be dramatically underdetermined. ough I am sympathetic with
this response, a more modest reply is simply to call for circumspection. As a matter
of actual practice, it is common to garner evidence about judgment internalism by
appealing to intuitions about judgments expressed in natural language. e above
quote fromGibbard is a prototypical example. But in light of the various dimensions
along which putative normative terms can diﬀer, we should be cautious about mak-
ing such appeals. ey may be less probative into the nature of normative judgment
than we initially thought.
For present purposes I am happy to rest content with this more modest conclu-
sion. But I would like to close by raising a brief counter-worry of my own. I would
like to take a step back and reĘect on a more general meta-theoretical question:
What are we doing when we describe certain judgments, concepts, or language as
“normative”? e worry is that plausible ways of answering this question will ren-
der theses like judgment internalism—construed as theses about normative judg-
ments/concepts/language in general—either trivial or obviously empirically false.
On the one hand, suppose we characterize “normative” judgments in linguistic
terms. First, suppose we treat them as judgments expressed with particular linguis-
tic expressions or constructions. Perhaps they are the judgments which are “fraught
with ‘ought’ ” (S : ; cf. G : x). Or perhaps they are the
judgments expressed by sentences like “ ‘I must  ’, ‘I ought to  ’, ‘it would be best,
all things considered, for me to  ’, etc.” (W : ). As the discussion in
this paper should make clear, no such characterization will do. e class of paradig-
matic normative terms is quite a variegated lot. e broader the class of expressions
we use to characterize normative judgments, the more obviously false a thesis like
judgment internalism is. Few, if any, expressions exclusively receive intuitively nor-
mative interpretations in all contexts. e narrower the class, the less clear it is
Even for ‘must’, and likely for imperatives as well: ‘Must’ can receive non-normative read-
ings (e.g., epistemic, metaphysical) and, even for intuitively normative readings, may permit non-

that our subject matter is the one we initially cared about. Most judgments tradi-
tionally thought of as being normative won’t count as normative. And a thesis like
judgment internalism becomes trivialized. It amounts to the claim that there is a
necessary connection between motivation and making a judgment expressed using
a term that conventionally presents one as endorsing the considerations that would
justify it. Even if internalism is conceptually true, if true, I doubt that this is the
conceptual truth that ethicists and metaethicists have cared about.
Alternatively, second, suppose we treat the normative judgments as the judg-
ments expressed by uses of language of a particular sort. Perhaps they are the judg-
ments expressed by speciĕcally directive uses of words like ‘ought’, ‘must’, etc., or
those expressed by speciĕcally directive speech acts, performed bywhatever linguis-
tic means. In fact, I think this is how we ought to proceed. e topic of directive
and endorsing language has aﬀorded many rich avenues of research in formal se-
mantics and pragmatics, descriptive linguistics, speech act theory, and philosophy
of language more generally. But delimiting the class of normative judgments in this
way again runs the risk of trivializing the question of judgment internalism. e
question reduces to whether there is a necessary connection between motivation
and making a judgment that aims at getting oneself to do something and presents
oneself as endorsing the considerations that would justify it. Call me parochial, but
this doesn’t strike me as an interesting question.
Now to the other hand. Suppose we characterize normative judgments in non-
linguistic terms. For instance, we might characterize them functionally as those
judgments that characteristically direct, guide, or—dare I say—motivate us. Such
a characterization opens up a rich topic for philosophical and psychological investi-
gation. But it too reduces questions about the nature of normative judgment to trivi-
ality. Judgment internalism reduces to the thesis that there is a necessary connection
between motivation and making a judgment individuated in part by its function to
motivate (direct, guide, etc.).
I don’t intend this outline of a dilemma to be decisive. ere may be an alter-
native way of characterizing normative judgment on which the thesis of judgment
internalism is interesting, and perhaps true. My primary aim is to encourage criti-
cal reĘection on the terms with which we frame our inquiry. ere are features of
language and thought that we have been homing in on in our talk of “normative”
terms, concepts, and judgments. Research in philosophy of language and linguistics,
endorsing uses for some speakers (§). Imperatives might be the best bet, though even these can
sometimes merely express wishes (‘Have a good day’, ‘Be a home run’).
For claims in this spirit, see K : , ; T : –, –;
G : –; F : ; P : , , ; R : .

as well as philosophy of mind and psychology, can help us delineate these features.
is has the potential to clarify our initial questions and open up new avenues of
research. But it also raises the possibility that some of these questions may be less
motivated than we initially thought. Couching our inquiry in terms of a class of
“normative” language, concepts, and judgments may obscure the phenomena. Bet-
ter, perhaps, to see ourselves as examining directive and endorsing uses of language,
on the one hand, and motivational types of states of mind, on the other.
 Conclusion
e notion of obligation is central in ethics. is isn’t for no reason: As one classic
English grammar text notes, “Deontic necessity is commonly glossed as ‘obligation’,
but the noun obligation covers the range of should as well asmust” (H &
P : ). On the one hand, we are oen interested in investigating what
we are actually required to do. We wish to guide others’ behavior and our own in
light of the norms we accept. An endorsing strong necessity modal like ‘must’ is
well-suited to the task. However, using ‘must’ is oen awkward. We may want to
talk about obligations that held in the past, or obligations that may go unfulĕlled or
be overridden in the future. Or we may want to communicate information about
a body of norms without necessarily registering commitment to them or enjoining
others to share in such commitment. A modal like ‘should’ or ‘be required to’ can
be more suitable. ere is a wide range of expressive resources at our disposal for
coordinating our actions and expressing our normative views in conversation, de-
liberation, and planning. is is for the better given the variety of our purposes. But
it also raises a philosophical risk. Inattention to the particularities of the language
we use can lead to misinterpretation of the nature and import of our judgments.
We began with a common, and oen implicit, simplifying assumption among
ethicists that expressions like ‘ought’, ‘must’, ‘duty’, ‘required’, etc. are equivalent for
expressing deontic necessity and obligation. Bracketing diﬀerences among such ex-
pressions might have turned out to be harmless for the purposes of normative in-
quiry— “let the semanticist sort them out,” one might have said. But we have seen
that insensitivity to diﬀerences among necessity modals can obscure intuitions and
hinder theorizing. On the Ęip side, better understanding the language we use in
substantive normative discussion can help us ask clearer, better motivated ques-
tions and bring into relief directions for future inquiry. In this paper we examined
two speciĕc dimensions along which normative vocabulary can diﬀer— strength
and patterns of (non-)endorsing use—and applied insights about these dimensions

to help capture competing intuitions in debates about dilemmas, supererogation,
and judgment internalism. But the import of the underlying strategy extends more
broadly. We oen come to the substantive normative table with implicit views about
how normative language works, some correct but others not. Locating these as-
sumptions can free up our normative investigations. Inquiry into normative lan-
guage and conversation can clarify and improve normative evaluation in practice.
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